

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

**COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES:
PROVIDING FOR THEIR “COMMON” DEFENSE**

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC LOGIC/THE NATURE OF WAR
SEMINAR O/C

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The most significant threat to United States national interests, regional security and international security in the Western Hemisphere is the long, complex and violent internal war in Colombia. Colombia and the United States have been closely tied politically and economically since the United States recognized the young republic in 1822. In the last three decades, the demand for illicit drugs in the United States has fueled the conflict. Concurrently, the United States assistance has been rendered to Colombia through the narrow scope of counterdrug programs. This analysis and other sequential approaches of political support, economic support or direct military assistance treat symptoms not the disease. Both the analysis and prospective solution set, pertaining to Colombia, must address the root of the problem. Colombia is engaged in protracted counterinsurgency that threatens its sovereignty. Notably since the 1980s, the United States has centered its efforts and tethered its assistance to Colombia to the counterdrug war.

In 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was directed to dispatch a team to assess the Colombian situation, then embroiled in ten years of civil war, a period known as La Violencia. In short, the CIA concluded that the civil war was fueled by a predilection to violence in Colombia, absence of state authority in rural areas and inequitable land reform. The CIA recommendation of a comprehensive nation-building package to Secretary of State Herter and the new Colombian President, Alberto Lleras, was dismissed. Only the security measures were implemented.¹

Forty-four years later, with Colombia's complex insurgency white-hot and the United States facing global threats from transnational nonstate actors, the United States and Colombia must execute a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. The United States has the

opportunity to create external conditions and assist Colombia internally that will allow Colombia to regain its legitimate democratic authority and achieve peace.

Our “Common” Defense

In April 2001, at the Quebec Summit of the Americas, President Bush said, “We have a great vision before us, a fully democratic hemisphere bound together by goodwill and free trade. ... The interests of my Nation, of all our Nations are served by strong, healthy, democratic neighbors, ...”.² Colombia matters to the United States for the following reasons: regional stability, democratization and rule of law, economic ties and drug reduction. The United States receives 20% of its oil from Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela and Colombia is the fifth largest export market for the United States in Latin America. Regrettably, Colombia is also the source of 80% of the cocaine demanded by the United States’ illicit drug market. Additionally, between 1995-1998, half a million Colombian citizens have emigrated from Colombia most to the United States.³

Colombia’s population and democracy are under assault by insurgents, paramilitaries and narcotraffickers with an estimated combined income of over \$300 million dollars from drugs. Colombia lost \$500 million dollars in revenue from sabotage to the Camo Limon oil pipeline last year. In 2001, 3,000 Colombians have been killed in terror attacks and an additional 2,856 kidnapped by insurgents of paramilitaries. Since 1992, 51 U. S. citizens have been kidnapped with 10 murdered.⁴

Regionally, Colombia’s wars have spilled over throughout the Andean region and Amazon basin (Map 1). Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama have all battled border violence, weapons smuggling, kidnapping, assassinations, and drug smuggling.⁵ Peru and Venezuela have had recent success in reducing coca cultivation only to see it migrate over the border to

Colombia. The United States recognizes Colombia as the keystone in the Andean region. A strong, democratic Colombia will provide stability and inspiration to the Region. Additionally, a viable Colombia reduces the potential for international terrorism and crime to grow and operate from its borders.

In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released in September 2002, President Bush specifically linked Colombia, international terrorists groups, insurgents in Colombia and the financial support for these non-state actors generated by the drug trade. He clearly stated that, “unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the United States.”⁶ To return governance to Colombia, the United States and Colombia must both understand the threat strategically and address it in partnership.

Seeds of Conflict

Despite the geographic divides, resulting from three formidable mountain ranges and the deep jungles of the Amazon basin, Colombia has maintained a strong common culture grounded in democracy and Catholicism. Race or communism, as perceived initially by the United States, has not provided impetus for social division. The lines of division have been drawn between ownership of land and economic advantage.⁷ Remarkably, Colombia has demonstrated a resilience to fracture.

Colombia gained its independence from Spain in 1819. The descendants of Spanish rulers retained control of political power and the agricultural land, the true source of economic power. By the mid-nineteenth century, two parties the Liberals and the Conservatives formed.⁸ Ideological differences between Liberals and Conservatives led to periods of violence both regionally and nationally. Peasants took part out of loyalty to local landowners not as response to a class struggle. Spurned by a disputed Conservative presidential election victory in 1898 and

a drop in worldwide coffee prices, the parties clashed in the War of a Thousand Days from 1899-1902. It ended after an estimated hundred thousand Colombians were killed and the Liberal leaders were granted amnesty.⁹

The second significant period of violence in Colombia was called La Violencia. In 1948, triggered by the assassination of a popular, Liberal land reformer, Eliecer Gaitan, Liberal-aligned peasants revolted. The Conservative government was joined by Liberal elites, who feared a social-based revolution, and brutally repressed the uprising. When two leading Liberal party officials were killed in 1949, the violence spread into a general civil conflict between Conservatives and Liberals. The United States assessed the problem as communism rather than the underlying disparity of land ownership and lawlessness.¹⁰ La Violencia continued until 1957 when two former Presidents, one Conservative and one Liberal, with the backing of the people overthrew the sitting military leader. The Declaration of Sitges established the National Front and called for elections every four years and party equality in other offices. La Violencia ended with an estimated two hundred thousand dead.¹¹

In the 1960s, rising from the seeds sown in La Violencia, numerous armed peasant groups continued to press for land reform and economic opportunity. These groups provided the nucleus for several guerrilla movements. Manuel “Tirofijo” (Sureshot) Marulanda formed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1966 with direct roots to the Colombian Communist party. The National Liberation Army (ELN) was organized by university students and focused primarily on attacking Colombia’s oil economy.¹² The United States remained engaged with Colombia and viewed these movements as part of the worldwide communist assault on democracy not unlike other internal wars in Latin America.

In 1974, the Liberal and Conservative faced off for the presidency of Colombia closing the period of the National Front. The coalition government failed to address the critical inequalities of land distribution and dramatic increase in poverty. Colombia's workforce in poverty rose from 25% to 50.7% and in the rural areas, 25.4% to 67.5%. Stimulated by these conditions and the surging demand for cocaine in the 1970s, Colombian urban unemployed and landless peasants migrated to the ungoverned, FARC-controlled regions to cultivate coca plants for profit.¹³

In the post-National front years, Colombia continued to cope with its limited but persistent insurgencies. Intertwined with the rising demand for illicit narcotics, mainly from the United States and Europe, growing disparity between the rich and poor and the growth of international drug cartels, Colombia experienced short periods of truce with the insurgents. In the 1990s, Colombia emerged as the major source of cocaine for the U. S. drug demand. The United States turned up the pressure on Colombia to corral this growing problem. The United States vision was shortsighted focusing only on the narcotics dilemma not the roots of instability. In 1996, President Clinton decertified Colombia as a "cooperating country" because Colombian President Ernesto Samper had taken campaign contributions from both the Medellin and Cali drug cartels.¹⁴


When Andres Pastrana assumed the presidency of Colombia in 1998, the United States was eager to reengage in Colombia. Again, the U. S. strategy was counterdrug-centric. Pastrana's "peace first" effort brought him in conflict with the Colombian military leaders who advocated a stronger stance in the civil war that threatened the survival of Colombia. Initially, Pastrana's peace initiative appeared promising, however, FARC leader, Marulanda, did not participate and the insurgents resumed the offensive in the summer of 1999.¹⁵

With the conflict at a steady boil, the Colombian people elected by overwhelming majority, Alvaro Uribe, who campaigned as the “law and order” president. President Uribe assumed office on 7 August 2002.¹⁶ Uribe and Colombia face a challenge of considerable magnitude. But, for Colombia and the United States, the opportunity exists to exercise leadership and partnership and to formulate a comprehensive strategy.

Colombia's Medusa

Uribe's Colombia is embroiled in three interrelated wars. Three non-state actors, drug traffickers, insurgents and paramilitaries are perpetuating an orgy of violence, corruption, and internal and external stability. Colombia's strategic problem is centered in the activities of these three non-state actors.¹⁷ Adding to this both Colombia's significant economic downturn and social upheaval, Colombia is at the crossroads of failure or recovery.¹⁸

Economically, Colombia posted a steady growth for sixty years. In the mid-1990s, political instability and falling prices on primary exports such as coffee caused the economy to plunge. Notable is the negative growth of gross domestic product per capita, -0.3, in 2001. The graph illustrates Colombia's weakened financial posture.¹⁹ Two key social indicators marking



Source: World Bank Group Data and Statistics www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/html

the lack of governance in Colombia is the homicide rate and displaced persons data. The homicide rate from 1974-1995 went from 15 to 92 per 100,000. In the bracket of male's aged 14-44, the number rose from 14 to 394 per 100,000, an increase of 1350%. In 1998, the index of displaced persons was as high as 1.2 million.²⁰

The insurgent war is being pressed by the FARC and the ELN. It is estimated that the FARC and ELN control or influence 40-50% of Colombian rural territory. As of January 2001, the Colombian Defense Ministry strength estimates were 16.5 thousand for the FARC and 4.5 thousand for the ELN. The guerrillas are well equipped and financed through their respective connections with drug traffickers.²¹ The FARC are organized into 7 territorial blocs (see Map 2). The FARC were originally Marxist-Leninist based and their grand strategy follows that legacy. The FARC are entrenched in the rural, coca growing areas of the southeastern and eastern parts of the country. The FARC lacks popular support, demonstrated by Uribe's landslide election. However, the FARC remains a formidable military threat to the legitimate authority of the government.²² The ELN, concentrated in the northeast, are conducting an "economic strategy" with the goal of achieving political parity with FARC in negotiations with the Colombian government. The ELN frequently conducted sabotage on the Camo Limon oil pipeline and other major infrastructure.²³

The paramilitaries rose from peasant self-defense groups that were organized by large owners to protect their holdings and back their refusal to pay revolutionary taxes to the insurgent groups. The paramilitaries have become well organized, well armed and fully financed through their association with large landowners and drug traffickers. The paramilitaries and the guerrillas are directly opposed fighting over the same land, resources and populace.²⁴ The paramilitaries have rallied nationally around the leadership of Carlos Castano and his United

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia(AUC).²⁵ The AUC and guerrilla operations and tactics mirror each other. The AUC are viewed generally by the Colombian as the lesser of 2 evils because of their direct conflict with the guerrillas. The AUC connection with drug traffickers and often, passive support by the government forces have given the paramilitaries strength. President Uribe has outlawed all armed self-defense forces as a challenge to state authority.²⁶

The third armed non-state actors fueling the violence are the narcotraffickers. In Colombia, the illicit drug industry essentially runs like a major multinational consortium. The drug industry is well organized in a hierarchal system with its own lawyers and enforcers. Narcotraffickers have no political agenda but thrive in violence, chaos and lawlessness present in Colombia.²⁷

Since the 1980s, a nexus of the illegal drug industry, insurgents and paramilitaries have eroded the legitimacy and peace in Colombia. Common motives of accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of action and legitimacy has linked this coalition of convenience. Traffickers need manpower and muscle. The insurgents and paramilitaries need money and logistics.²⁸ Competition of goals and resources provides the impetus for violence. This “Hobbesian Trinity” has developed a war system that links each of the 3 non-state actors in a dynamic relationship marked by the exercise of violence. Three conditions in Colombia fed the growth of the war system. First, historically democratic institutions in Colombia failed to mediate disputes, enforce laws and address social grievances. Second, the non-state actors adapted to conflict and benefited from conflict in pursuit of their respective interests. Third, the war system reached an uneasy balance where no one group in conflict can achieve the upper hand.²⁹ The war system has been and is profitable. The low intensity conflict has not been

costly enough to force the insurgents, paramilitaries and drug traffickers to pursue peace. Consequently, democracy in Colombia remains threatened.³⁰

Strategic Analysis: Looking at Medusa

Although driven by a complex war system, Colombia's internal war is a counterinsurgency struggle and has been since its beginning. Since the 1970s, the accelerants of drugs and the nexus of the 3 non-state actors vying for legitimacy and wealth have fueled Colombia's war. Concurrently, the United States focused its security assistance to Colombia on one of the accelerants, drugs. This narrow solution to the comprehensive problem of counterinsurgency contributed to the criticality of the issue presently. The United States, burdened with the failures in Vietnam, risk aversion and minimalist approach, did not formulate a strategy with and for Colombia that allowed the Colombian government to gain the advantage.

Colombia's counterinsurgency has the characteristics that define this type of conflict: sanctuary, external support, power and violence, challenge to legitimate authority and control of the rural population. Colombia's compartmentalized geography provides sanctuary for the insurgents, paramilitaries and drug traffickers. External support is found in the narco-money and is connected transnationally. Each group wields power capable of intimidation and violence to enforce its interests. All three non-state actors struggle to control the rural population as a resource of production. Meanwhile, the Colombian government fights to reassert its governance over its people. Historical analysis of several internal wars in Central America, Peru, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia reveal key points that directly outline the challenges facing Colombia and have not been addressed. These key points are:

- 1) Civil authority established and mobilized for war.
- 2) Counterinsurgency requires significant investment of resources, time and people.

- 3) Military institutional reforms often necessary with focus on special operations.
- 4) National campaign developed to protect the populous, protect infrastructure and attrite the insurgents.

For Colombia, winning on the battlefield matters but it is not sufficient to achieve peace.³¹

Additionally, several principles of Clausewitz provide further understanding of Colombia's internal war. Colombia's center of gravity is legitimate state authority. Within its territory, the state must have the moral and ethical monopoly on force in order to provide for the safety and freedom of its citizens. A second principle, knowing what type of war your in, was fundamental to understanding this conflict. Both Colombia and the United States directed resources and time at symptoms of the conflict instead of developing a comprehensive strategy to address the counterinsurgency. A third principle is Clausewitz's trinity of the state, the military and the people. This trinity in Colombia is fractured and had not been mobilized to provide the mutual support necessary to succeed in war.³²

The United States and Colombia have the opportunity mutually develop a comprehensive strategy that would allow Colombia to defeat its internal threat. The United States can create conditions externally and assist internally in Colombia that optimize Colombia's means in pursuit of its objectives. A thorough counterinsurgency strategy applied, by the United States, internationally, regionally and bilaterally with Colombia, will assist Colombia in breaking the status quo of power leading to state authority. Fundamentally, both Colombia and, especially, the United States must understand that this is a long-term effort.

Strategic Opportunity and Recommendations : Severing the head of Medusa

It is clear that Colombia is at a critical juncture in its fight to reassert its legitimacy. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States have clearly established the nature of

conflict facing the United States and its allies: global terrorism, international crime and networks of non-state actors.³³ President Bush, in the National Security Strategy of the United States, directly linked the instability in Colombia with these global threats to democratic nations and prosperity. The national interests and goals of the United States and Colombia, articulated by both President Bush and President Uribe, have indicated a leadership stance and impetus toward a mutually supporting strategy in Colombia. The preceding administrations of both countries provided some initial movement toward a Colombian solution with the approval of a policy package called Plan Colombia. Bush and Uribe have the opportunity to create momentum to achieving goals in Colombia.

Plan Colombia was developed by Pastrana administration in conjunction with the Clinton administration. The Plan was presented to the United States Congress in September of 1999. To underwrite the Plan, Pastrana provided \$4 billion dollars in Colombian funds and sought an additional \$3.5 billion dollars from the United States, European Union, Japan and Canada. The ten-part Plan was scaled with broad proposals to attack the political, social, economic and military problems facing Colombia.³⁴

Elements of Plan Colombia and components of U. S. involvement

ELEMENTS	COMPONENTS OF U. S. SUPPORT	BREAKDOWN OF \$1.3 BILLION IN U. S. SUPPORT
1. Economic recovery		
2. Fiscal reforms		
3. Increase military strength and efficiency		
4. Reform judiciary and human rights programs	1. Judicial reform and human rights	13%
5. Counternarcotics	2. Expansion of counternarcotics 3. Increased interdiction efforts 4. Assistance to Colombian National Police	81.5%
6. Alternative development	5. Alternative development	5.5%
7. Popular mobilization		
8. Social programs		
9. Peace process		
10. International support		

Source: Noss and Spencer, 'Colombia: Strategic End State, Goals, and Means...A Workshop Report', 11-12.

Plan Colombia, from a Colombian perspective, was flawed because it was presented by Pastrana as an attempt at peace without any political or military strength to enforce it. The United States, again, was completely focused on the counternarcotic effort continuing its pattern of narrow response to a complex problem. Despite these drawbacks, Plan Colombia has functioned as a foundation strategy. Presidents Bush and Uribe have and should continue to build and expand on the core elements of Plan Colombia moving toward the comprehensive counterinsurgency package required. Appendix A provides details of U. S. support and projects for Plan Colombia and related activities as reported by the U. S. Department of State (March 2001).

Political Objectives and Economic Measures

A coordinated strategy between Colombia and the United States must be latticed with mutually supporting objectives or ends. Colombia's critical political objectives are reasserting legitimacy over its territory and achieving a negotiated peace. Mobilizing his country for war and gaining the advantage militarily are necessary conditions to achieve those ends. President Uribe has taken initial steps to strengthen the Colombian military and should continue to do so. Under emergency powers, President Uribe has authorized the recruitment of 6,000 soldiers for 2 mobile brigades and the training of 10,000 new police officers. He has invoked a 1.2% war tax on 400,000 upper income citizens and businesses to raise an additional \$800 million dollars in war funds.³⁵

President Bush's Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), launched in April 2001, supplements Plan Colombia focusing on similar functional areas but targeting the entire Andean region. The political objective is the stability of Colombia and its Andean neighbors that experience spill-over from the Colombian conflict. ARI funding provides greater economic and social program assistance than Plan Colombia.³⁶ ARI includes the recently passed Andean Trade Preference Act

(Aug 2002) intended to stimulate the regions economies as a supporting effort to political stabilization.³⁷ In a larger view, ARI is a means for the United States to bolster the external cordon, reduce the sanctuaries of violence and restrict the movements of non-state actors in the region raising Colombia's advantage internally.

Military Objectives and Measures

Military objectives are defined, linked and validated in reference to the political objectives each military objective supports. Where the military objective falls in building the pyramid to achieve the political objective differs in each campaign and conflict. In Colombia, the means to achieve the paramount political objective, reasserting government legitimacy, is the military (security forces) being the dominant executor of force within the country. Colombia's military and police forces are the only institutions that can take direct action against the nexus of non-state actors and change the status quo power.

Colombia's primary military objective must be to attrite the guerrillas. There are options to address the paramilitaries. Force maybe necessary, however, military success against the guerrillas and the political leadership of Uribe may lead to co-option and disarming of the paramilitaries. Uribe's declaration that all armed groups are illegal and U. S. addition of the AUC to its terrorist list clearly define the picture for the paramilitaries. AUC inclusion in the political process for peace may induce compromise. The narcotraffickers should be addressed as a law enforcement issue and a mutually supporting effort. The drug business is a complex, long-term problem that will certainly be degraded by successful military action. As stated previously, U. S. focus on the counterdrug effort has not been an enabler for the Colombian government to assume a position of strength.

The capabilities and vulnerabilities of the guerrillas and paramilitaries are similar. Both groups are capable of credible small unit military action. Additional guerrilla strengths are their 40 years of combat experience and entrenchment in remote regions of Colombia. The narcotraffickers also have armed groups for protection and enforcement but it's the symbiotic relationship with the other 2 groups that provide the narcotraffickers security. The war system generated by the nexus of the 3 groups also has a common center of gravity, popular support. Terror, violence and intimidation are not ideologies that attract the Colombian people. The common denominator is the manpower to grow coca, process the product and move it out for export. Separating this center of gravity from the war system will require multiple means (political, economic, social), however, military action against the non-state groups is fundamental. Additionally, the population is the third point of Clausewitz's trinity that Colombia must protect and mobilize (Uribe, military and the people).

The Colombian Army (COLAR) and the National Police have faced a sustained assault from the 3 illegal groups as well as institutional limitations that have hampered the military's ability to break the status quo. Training, professionalization, mobility and command and control are personnel and technical challenges that the Colombian government and military must address. The COLAR numbers approximately 145,000 personnel of which only 30,000 are professionals and only 20,000 are actually engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The National Police have about 100,000 personnel spread thinly across the Colombia.³⁸ The center of gravity of the security forces (military and national police) is the size and organization of the security forces. Specifically, the number of trained professionals within the overall organization and the number of those professionals engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Simply put, Colombia needs more tooth than tail. President Uribe's steps to increase funding, the size and

training for security forces must continue and must be supported by the United States.

Additionally, Colombia must develop an integrated and interagency campaign plan for security.

For the United States to achieve its ends in Colombia, our security assistance must blend with the Colombians' plans. Presently, the United States is capped at 400 military advisors and 400 contractors in country. Additionally, all assistance to Colombian military units is vetted against that unit's human rights record. Both these conditions are U. S. Congressional mandates.³⁹ Under these conditions, the desired end is certainly achievable. Both conditions contribute directly to a highly trained, mobile, and professional Colombian fighting force. The limitation that security assistance and physical support from the United States must be applied directly to counterdrug efforts must be modified or removed. The ability for Colombia to unhinge the status quo and move toward an achievable peace lies first with the military point of Clausewitz's trinity.

Costs and Benefits: Going after Medusa's Head

For Colombia, the benefits of a comprehensive and aggressive counterinsurgency plan supported by the United States far exceed the costs. Colombia is at a critical stage in its struggle. Colombia can take the responsibility and initiative to reassert legitimacy over its entire territory and bring peace and prosperity to its people or remain the violent quagmire and source of instability in the region. President Uribe has set the course for returning to a viable democratic nation. Colombian military action is the impetus needed to achieve Uribe's goal.

For the United States, the costs of financial assistance, security assistance and mustering regional and international support for Colombia pales against the potential benefits. The potential reduction in drug flow to the United States is a subset benefit of a stable Colombia. However, attacking the demand-side of the economic system of drugs in the United States,

notably, contributes to the success of the overall strategy. The U. S. goal, a Colombia, democratic and strong, brings stability to a troubled region and eliminates a potential sanctuary or support for global terrorists. This is the opportune time for the United States to bolster Colombia with a minimal exertion of direct U. S. military power. Besides, the employment of U. S. combat forces will not totally address the complex counterinsurgency problem in Colombia.

Conclusion

The turmoil in Colombia has reached a critical juncture. Colombia fractured physically and socially by the internal conflict of insurgents, paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Colombia is unable to protect its citizens or wield legitimate force within its borders to eliminate the threats to good governance. Colombia is on the doorstep to collapse. However, since its democratic foundations, Colombia has been resilient in rising from periods of internal violence and remaining a functional democracy.

For the United States, Colombia has been a long-term political and economic partner. Colombia is the linchpin of regional security and can be the example of democratic success. To achieve the baseline end, a democratic Colombia with legitimate and complete sovereignty over its territory and people, United States strategy for assistance and Colombian strategy of action must be mutually supporting. The following outline summarizes key points of recommendation:

Broad Strategy:

1. Know the war you're in, whether in direct action or assistance.
2. A protracted counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy to defeat.
3. Colombia has ownership and responsibility of conflict.

4. U. S. assistance must create conditions for success. Allow Colombia the means to achieve the ends.
5. Specifically, U. S. must reduce or eliminate self-imposed restrictions on assistance that limits use to counterdrug operations.

Specific Strategy:

1. Coordinate/integrate the Colombian military goals and objectives and U. S. military assistance.
2. Train the right force for the counterinsurgency fight.
3. For the U. S., security assistance with Special Forces and contractors provides economy-of-force in current world situation.
4. U. S./Colombian force-to-force contact raises professionalization.
5. Train the key instrument, the Colombian military, required to break the stalemate of power and reassert government authority.
6. No U. S. combat troops (units) are neither necessary nor desired by Colombians.

As addressed, the counterinsurgency strategy must be comprehensive. In addition to the summary above, political, economic and social reforms must be concurrent. Appendix A (Plan Colombia) provides further details of ongoing U. S. assistance in these programs.

Presently, the leadership in Colombia with President Uribe and the leadership in the United States with President Bush are present to start down the road to success in Colombia. Maybe, the 1958 plan by the CIA needs a second look.


Map 1: Colombia departments and cities.



Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix. Used with permission. Data source: Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds. Colombia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990, p. xxii.

Source: Serafino, "Colombia: Conditions and U. S. Policy Option."

Map 2: FARC Blocs and Fronts.



Source: Chalk and Rabassa, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its implications for Regional Stability*, 28.

Appendix A(1): U.S. Support for Plan Colombia

Five Components of U. S. Assistance	
I. Support for Human Rights and Judicial Reform	The total U.S. interagency assistance package provides \$122 million for a broad range of human rights, judicial reform, and other programs designed to support the peace process and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in Colombia. Specific initiatives include protecting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights (\$4 million); strengthening human rights institutions (\$7 million); establishing human rights units within the Colombian National Police (CNP) and the Colombian attorney general's office (\$25 million); training judges and prosecutors (\$7.5 million); and providing funding to train and support Colombian law enforcement personnel in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and anti-kidnapping measures.
II. Expansion of Counter-Narcotics Operations into Southern Colombia	<p>The total U.S. interagency assistance package includes \$390.5 million to support the Government of Colombia's objective to gain control of the drug producing regions of southern Colombia. These funds will support certain aspects of training and equipping the second and third counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian army. It will fund procurement and support of 14 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters (\$208 million); procurement, refurbishment, and support of 30 UH-1H Huey II helicopters (\$60 million); and support for 15 UH-1N helicopters (\$60 million) for use by the Colombian army.</p> <p>Funding for this element of Plan Colombia includes important humanitarian assistance and development components. It includes \$15 million to help persons displaced by conflict in the region. This funding is in addition to funds previously provided by the U.S. Government to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist internally displaced persons in Colombia. This funding component also provides \$10 million in developmental assistance, including technical and agricultural assistance to farmers in southern Colombia.</p>
III. Alternative Economic Development	The total U.S. interagency assistance package provides \$81 million to support alternative and economic development programs in Colombia to assist small farmers who now grow coca and opium poppies make the transition to legal economic activity as interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less profitable. These funds are in addition to funds provided for alternative development associated with the Colombian Government's efforts focused on southern Colombia. Included within this package are \$27.5 million to assist internally displaced persons, more than \$30 million for voluntary eradication programs, \$12 million in assistance to local governments, and \$2.5 million for environmental programs to protect fragile lands and watersheds. Funds are also made available for alternative and economic development in Bolivia (\$85 million) and Ecuador (\$8 million).
IV. Increased Interdiction	The assistance package provides \$129.4 million to enhance U.S. and Colombian narcotics interdiction efforts. The majority of these funds (\$68 million) are dedicated to upgrading the radar systems in four U.S. Customs Service P-3 airborne early warning interdiction aircraft used to detect and monitor suspect targets destined for the United States from cocaine source zones, including Colombia; \$16.9 million has been made available to upgrade the Colombian Air Force OV-10 aircraft, \$19.5 million to support Colombian air interdiction programs, \$14 million to support and provision Colombia's riverine interdiction program, and \$1 million to support the Colombian navy's counternarcotics intelligence infrastructure. In addition \$18 million has been made available to support interdiction programs in other countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean, including specifically Bolivia and Ecuador.
V. Assistance for the Colombian National Police	The total U.S. interagency assistance package includes \$115.6 million to support the CNP. This includes \$26 million for procurement, training, and support for two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters; \$20.6 million for 12 UH-1H Huey II helicopters; and \$20 million for purchase of Ayers S2R T-65 agricultural spray aircraft and OV-10 aircraft. Funds are also made available for communications equipment, ammunition, spare parts, training, and logistical support.

Source: U. S. Department of State, "Plan Colombia", <www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042pf.htm>

Appendix A(2): U.S. Support for Plan Colombia

Related Issues	
The Peace Process	<p>The U.S. and Colombian Governments agree that ending the civil conflict is central to solving Colombia's problems. A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery, and help assure the protection of human rights. A successful peace process would also restore the authority and control of the Colombian Government in the coca-growing region. The U.S. Government is hopeful that the peace negotiations now going on between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group and the Colombian Government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group prove successful.</p> <p>U.S. assistance in support of Plan Colombia is intended to counter the illicit trade in narcotics. All U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia will continue to be in the form of training, goods, and services. The counternarcotics components of Plan Colombia will be implemented by the Colombian police and the Colombian armed forces.</p>
Human Rights	<p>U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided under strict application of U.S. law designed to protect human rights -- the so-called "Leahy Amendment." No U.S. assistance is provided to any unit of the Colombian security forces for which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations, unless the Secretary of State is able to certify that the Government of Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. The U.S. Government has in place a rigorous process to screen those units being considered to receive assistance or training.</p>
Displaced Persons	<p>NGOs report that Colombia has the fourth-largest population of internally displaced persons in the world. The vicious conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas is largely responsible for the forced displacement of Colombians. A recent UNHCR report estimates an "accumulated total" of 525,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia who have not satisfactorily resettled or returned home. In 1999, the U.S. Government provided \$5.8 million to the ICRC's Western Hemisphere operations for assistance to IDPs, with an additional \$3 million earmarked for Colombia. The U.S. contributed another \$4.7 million to UNHCR's general fund for the Western Hemisphere, a portion of which was used for institutional capacity building in Colombia.</p> <p>Note: Funding levels as contained in the Military Appropriations Act for FY 2001 (H.R. 4425)</p>

Source: U. S. Department of State, "Plan Colombia", <www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042pf.htm>

Notes

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